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Abstract
We provide an epistemic foundation for cooperative games by proof theory via studying the knowl-
edge for players unanimously accepting only core payoffs. We first transform each cooperative game
into a decision problem where a player can accept or reject any payoff vector offered to her based
on her knowledge about available cooperation. Then we use a modified KD-system in epistemic
logic, which can be regarded as a counterpart of the model for non-cooperative games in Bonanno
[7], [10], to describe a player’s knowledge, decision-making criterion, and reasoning process; es-
pecially, a formula called C-acceptability is defined to capture the criterion for accepting a core
payoff vector. Within this syntactical framework, we characterize the core of a cooperative game
in terms of players’ knowledge. Based on that result, we discuss an epistemic inconsistency behind
Debreu-Scarf Theorem, that is, the increase of the number of replicas has invariant requirement
on each participant’s knowledge from the aspect of competitive market, while requires unbounded
epistemic ability players from the aspect of cooperative game.
Keywords: cooperative game theory, the core, epistemic foundation, Debreu-Scarf theorem
1. Introduction
So far, research on epistemic aspect of game theory focuses on non-cooperative games (Perea
[34], Dekel and Siniscalchi [17], Bonanno [7], [10]), while for cooperatie games, it is yet to flourish.
The reason, in my opinion, lies in the role of players. In a non-cooperative game, the relation-
ship between players’ choices and the payoffs is specified; a player’s payoff depends on her own
choice as well as others’, hence she has to consider about the situation as well as the choice and
knowledge/belief of the opponents. In contrast, the relationship is obscure in cooperative games.
To be specific, let us have a closer look at the framework of cooperative game theory. Cooper-
ative game theory has two components: the description of a game situation and solution concepts.
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A game situation is described as a pair (N, v), where N is the set of players, and v is the charac-
teristic function which assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N a real number as its payoff which can be
achieved by collective activities of players in that coalition.1 Nevertheless, it is not clear what kind
of choices is allowed to be taken by each player and how the payoff of a coalition is determined by
their choices.2 A a solution concept is a set of payoff vectors satisfying some specified conditions.
Though those conditions are usually intended to capture concepts concerning distribution justice,
like equality or fairness. Yet there is no explicit connection between those conditions and each
player’s decision-making.
Therefore, if we take cooperative game theory as a passive discipline rather than a normative
one and anticipate to analyze coalitional behavior as intended by its founders von Neumann and
Morgenstern [48], it is necessary to provide an initiative role for each player. In the literature,
this problem is solved by implementing a cooperative game with a competitive market (Wilson
[49], Vohra [47], Dutta and Vohra [18], Myerson [30]), a matching (Roth [38], Chade [12], Liu
et. al. [28], Pometto [36]), or a non-cooperative game (i.e., the Nash program initiated by Nash
[31]. See Serrano [41]). In each case, since the solution of the cooperative game coincides with
the corresponding implementing model, studying the epistemic structure of the latter provides
fascinating insights into that of the former. Yet it has a problem. Since there is no formal
relationship between a cooperative game and its implementing models in general other than the
coincidence of their outcomes, when there are multiple models, it is difficult to determine which
is better and consequently whose epistemic structure is more “suitable” as a foundation of the
cooperative game. Further, even if the implementing model is unique, it still has to argue in what
sense its epistemic structure can also be regarded as that of the cooperative game.
Nevertheless, the essential logic behind the implementation approach is right. To provide an
initiative role for each player, we need specify a context for a cooperative game. In this paper,
we propose a simpler (if not naive) and more general approach. We first transform a cooperative
game into a decision problem by asking each player whether she would accept a payoff vector. Then
we use a modified KD-system in epistemic logic, which can be regarded as a counterpart of the
model for noncooperative games in Bonanno [7], [10], to describe a player’s knowledge, decision-
making criterion, and reasoning process for answering that question. Within this framework, we
characterize the epistemic structure of the core, one of the most famous solution concept, in terms
of players’ knowledge. The basic idea is illustrated as follows.
Example 1.1 (A cooperative game as a decision problem). Consider a 2-person game (N, v)
where v({1}) = v({2}) = 10 and v({1, 2}) = 30. The core of this game is {(x, 30−x) : 10 ≤ x ≤ 20}.
We take player 1’s viewpoint and consider a payoff vector (9, 21). To reject it, player 1 has to know
the highest payoff she can guarantee by herself, i.e., v({1}). For another payoff vector (10, 10),
player 1 needs to know the highest payoff she can guarantee by cooperating with player 2, i.e.,
v({1, 2}). Actually, it can be seen that for unanimously accepting only core payoffs, i.e., each payoff
in the core being accepted by both players and each payoff outside the core being rejected by at
1To be accurate, v(S) is a real number only in TU games, i.e., a game with side payment and transferable utility.
In NTU game, i.e., a game not satisfying the two conditions, v(S) is a ser of payoff vectors. In this paper we focus
on TU games.
2The original intented meaning of v(S) (S ⊆ N) of von Neuman and Morgenstern [48] is the highest sum of
payoffs of players in S that can be guaranteed. In literatures of market games (e.g., Debreu and Scarf [16], Shapley
and Shubik [45], Crawford and Knoer [14]), v(S) is the highest surplus that can be achieved by exchange among
players in S. However, in general v(S) only means Pareto frontier (for TU games) or feasible payoffs (for NTU games)
without specification of its members’ choices.
2
least one player, each player i needs to know v({i}), and at least one player has to know v({1, 2}).
In this paper, we generalize the above discussion. We first define a formula called C-acceptability
to capture the decision criterion corresponding to the core, and explore how much knowledge is
needed for players with C-acceptability as their criterion to accept unanimously a payoff vector if
and only if it belongs to the core. Our main result states that unanimous acceptance of only core
payoffs requires and only requires the each coalition’s highest achievable payoff is known to at least
one member of it.
This result provides a new perspective on some classical theorems in the literature, for example,
the theorem shown by Debreu and Scarf [16] stating that as the number of replicas of players
in a market increases unboundedly, the cores converge to competitive equilibrium. Through an
example, we will show that, as the number of players increases, to accept unanimously only the
core payoffs requires at least one player’s knowledge to grow accordingly; consequently, in the limit
some player’s knowledge should be unbounded. On the other hand, it has long been noticed that
the epistemic requirement for a competitive equilibrium is rather limited (Hayek [23], Bowles et al.
[6]), and the increase of the number of replicas does not change the required knowledge for each
player. This shows an epistemic inconsistency behind the mathematical convergence, which may
advance our understanding of the market price as a mechanism succinctly integrating complicated
information and coordinating people’s behavior.
Transforming a cooperative game into an accept-or-reject decision problem at the individual
level is neither artificial nor unfamiliar in the literature. Cooperative game theory studies socially
just allocation among players given their contributions described by the payoffs of coalitions. In
political philosophy and social welfare theory, a necessary condition for social justice is the agree-
ment upon it by fully rational individuals (Rawls [37]. See Freeman [20]). Actually, this approach
has long been exploited without any further discussion. One famous example is the accept-or-reject
process developed by Gale and Shapley [21] as an algorithm for calculating a stable matching.
To transform a cooperative game into a decision problem does not mean to implement it with
a non-cooperative game. In our model, we did not specify the payoff rule corresponding to each
profile of answers. Our intention is to develop a general framework, which is able to induce various
non-cooperative models. In Section 5.2, we will give some further discussion.
Epistemic logic has long been used in investigating epistemic aspect of non-cooperative games
(Fagin et al [19], Bonanno [10]). While most research is done by semantics,3 there is also a
group of researches using syntactic approach (e.g., Bonanno [7], [10], Kaneko [24], Kaneko and
Suzuki [25]). Semantics is relatively easier to deal with, and semantic and syntactic approaches
are basically equivalent with respect to the provable/valid propositions. Here we adopt syntactic
approach partly because it describes an individual’s reasoning process explicitly: what is one’s
beliefs/knowledge, what is one’s inference rule, and along what kind of reasoning process one
reaches the conclusion. This also helps to study computational and descriptional complexity of
epistemic structures. Another reason is that we do not require interpersonal inference, i.e., i
believes that j believes ..., which is more convenient to be treated by semantic approach. Since
our focus is how much knowledge is needed, we only require that each player has basic inference
ability (i.e., Modus Ponens) and has consistent belief. Hence we adopt the weaker system KD.
The hierarchy of interpersonal inference can also be discussed in our framework, which depends
3This is partly because the first model in game theory for knowledge hierarchy uses set-theoretical approach
(Aumann [1]) which is naturally related to Kripke model (Aumann and Brandenburger [2]). Another reason is the
syntax of epistemic logic is relatively not as developed as the semantics (Blackburn et al. [5]).
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on what kind of decision-making criterion a player adopts. In Section 5.2, we also discuss briefly
some alternative criteria where a player’s acceptance/rejection of a payoff vector depends on her
belief on others’ beliefs and others’ beliefs on others’ beliefs, and so on.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to cooperative game
theory and sequent calculus (a Gentzen-style proof calculus system). Section 3 formulates a player’s
decision-making process in a decision problem transformed from a cooperative game. There we
define C-acceptability as the decision criterion corresponding to the core. Based on it, we show
the main result. Section 4 discusses the epistemic inconsistency behind Debreu-Scarf Theorem.
Section 5 gives some concluding remarks.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Cooperative games and the core
In this subsection we give a survey of concepts about cooperative games with side payment
and transferable utility (abbreviated as TU game) and the core. For details, see Kannai [26] and
Peleg and Sudhoelter [33]. A TU game is a pair G = (N, v), where N = {1, ..., n} is the set of
players and v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0 is the characteristic function. For each coalition S ⊆ N,
v(S) is interpreted as the payoff achievable by collective activities of players in S. Given a TU
game G = (N, v), a payoff vector of G is an element x = (xi)i∈N ∈ RN which is interpreted as
an allocation plan where each player i ∈ N receives payoff xi. Cooperative game theory studies
payoffs satisfying various conditions, called solution concepts. One of the most important solution
concept is the core.
Definition 2.1 (Core). Let G = (N, v). The core of G, denoted by C(G), is the set of all payoff
vectors x = (xi)i∈N of G satisfying the following two conditions:
(Pareto-optimality) Σi∈Nxi = v(N);
(Coalitional rationality) for each S ⊆ N, Σi∈Sxi ≥ v(S).
Each payoff vector belonging to C(G) is called a core-payoff vector. Pareto-optimality means
that x should be feasible through the cooperation of all players in N. Coalitional rationality means
that no coalition can block x and achieve a higher payoff by cooperation among its members.
Therefore, coalition rationality can be alternatively defined by the unblockability of any coalition
as follows. Let x, y ∈ RN be payoff vectors of G and S ⊆ N. We say that y dominates x via S,
denoted by y domS x, iff the following conditions hold:
(1) yi ≥ xi for each i ∈ S;
(2) yi > xi for some i ∈ S.
It can be seen that C(G) = {x ∈ RN : Σi∈Nxi ≤ v(N) and there is no S ⊆ N and y ∈ RN with
Σi∈Nyi ≤ v(S) such that y domS x}.
Due to the finitistic character of the formal language, in this paper we focus on those x ∈ C(G)
such that xi ∈ N for each i ∈ N, though in Section 4 we will extend the discussion into rational
numbers under some restrictions. Here, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Let G = (N, v) satisfying v(S) ∈ N for each S ⊆ N . For each x ∈ NN with
Σi∈Nxi ≤ v(N), if x /∈ C(G), then there is some S ⊆ N and y ∈ RN satisfying the following three
conditions:
(a) y domS x;
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(b) Σi∈Syi ≤ v(S);
(c) yi × |N | ∈ N for each i ∈ N.
Proof. Since Σi∈Nxi ≤ v(N) and x /∈ C(G), there exists some S ⊆ N such that Σi∈Sxi < v(S).
Since v(S) ∈ N, it follows that v(S)− Σi∈Sxi ≥ 1. We define y ∈ RN as follows: for each i ∈ N,
yi =
{
xi + (v(S)− Σi∈Sxi)/|N | if i ∈ S,
0 if i /∈ S. (1)
We show that y defined in (1) satisfies conditions (a)-(c). (a) is satisfied since v(S)−Σi∈Sxi ≥ 1 > 0.
(b) holds since Σi∈Syi = Σi∈Sxi + |S| · (v(S)−Σi∈Sxi)/|N | ≤ Σi∈Sxi + |N | · (v(S)−Σi∈Sxi)/|N | =
v(S). (c) holds by construction. //
Not every TU game has a non-empty core. The theorem of Bondareva [11] and Shapley [42]
characterizes the non-emptiness of the core in terms of balancedness. We will discuss the relation-
ship between Bandareva-Shapley Theorem and our results in Section 5.1.
2.2. Epistemic logic and its application in cooperative games
In this subsection we give a brief survey for epistemic logic. A logic has three components: the
alphabet (symbols), words (formulae), and grammar (axiomatic schemata and inference rules). We
adopt sequent calculus, a Gentzen-style proof calculus system, since it is convenient for analyzing
reasoning structure. For a thorough introduction, see Blackburn et al. [5], Kaneko and Suzuki
[25], and Troelstra and Schwichtenberg [46]. We also show how to use epistemic logic to describe
a cooperative game.
We start from the following symbols.
Atomic formulae: p0,p1,p2, ...;
Logical connectives: ¬ (not), ∧ (and), ∨ (or), ⊃ (implies);
Belief operators: B1, B2, ..., Bn;
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Auxiliary symbols: parentheses: (, ); braces: {, }; commas: , .
Based on the symbols above, we define formulae inductively as follows:
F0. Each atomic formula is a formula;
F1. If A and C are formulae, so are ¬A, (A ⊃ C), and Bi(A);
F2. If A0, A1, ..., Am are formulae, so are ∧mk=1Ak and ∨mk=0Ak;
F3. Any formula is obtained by a finite number of applications of F0, F1, and F2.
We use At to denote the set of atomic formulae and P the set of all formulae. A formulae is
called non-epistemic iff it contains no belief operator.
Now we consider how to describe a player’s epistemic situation in a TU game. Let G = (N, v)
with v(S) ∈ N for each S ⊆ N and M ∈ N be an upper bound of all payments, i.e., v(S) << M
for each S ⊆ N.5 We define the set of atomic formulae At = At1∪ At2, where
At1 = {xS : S ⊆ N, x ∈ [0,M ]N such that for each i ∈ N, xi × |N | ∈ N},
At2 = {yT ≥S xU : yT , xU ∈ At1 and S ⊆ N}.
4In this paper we focus on knowledge (i.e., true beliefs) rather than beliefs. Nevertheless, here we still keeps the
name of Bi as belief operators for future researches where wrong beliefs are allowed.
5For example, the current world GDP. A “reasonable” upper bound of payoffs has long been used in game
theoretical models in the literature, e.g., Shapley [44].
5
At can be seen as the counterpart of the atomic formulae in epistemic logic for non-cooperative
games (Bonanno [7], [10]). The interpretation of each xS ∈ At1 is that “payoff vector x can be
obtained through some collective activity of players in S”, and that of yT ≥S xU in At1 is “inside
coalition S, each player’s payoff at y is no less than at x”. It should noted that the interpretation
of yT ≥S xU is different from y domS x, for the former does not require that yi > xi for some i ∈ S,
which is required in the latter. In the following, when S = {i} for some i ∈ N, we abbreviate yS
and yT ≥S xU to yi and yT ≥i xU , respectively. Also, we use yT >S xU as an abbreviation of the
formula yT ≥S xU ∧ ¬(xU ≥S yT ).
Let N<ω = {(i1, ..., im) : m ∈ N, i1, ..., im ∈ N}. It should be noticed that N<ω contains the
null sequence , i.e., the sequence with length 0, which is obtained by letting m = 0. For each
e = (i1, ..., im) ∈ N<ω, we use Be(A) as an abbreviation of Bi1Bi2 ...Bim(A); especially, B(A)
is equal to A. For e1 = (i1, ..., im), e2 = (j1, ..., jk) ∈ N<ω, define the concatenation operation
e1 ◦ e2 = (i1, ..., im, j1, ..., jk). We abbreviate (i) ◦ e and e ◦ (i) to i ◦ e and e ◦ i, respectively.
Now we define the sequent calculus of the epistemic logic. First, we introduce a concept
called thought sequent. A sequent is an expression of the form Γ → Θ, where Γ and Θ are finite
(probably empty) sets of formulae. We use |Γ| to denote the cardinality of Γ. A thought sequent
is an expression of the form Be[Γ → Θ] where Γ → Θ is a sequent and e ∈ N<ω. We abbreviate
B[Γ → Θ] as Γ → Θ, Be[Γ ∪∆ → Θ ∪ Λ] and Be[Γ ∪ {A} → Θ ∪ {C}] as Be[Γ,∆ → Θ,Λ] and
Be[Γ, A→ Θ, C], and {Be(A) : A ∈ Φ} as Be(Φ). For each e = (i1, ..., im) ∈ N<ω, the interpretation
of a thought sequence Be[Γ→ Θ] is that player i1 believes player i2 believes ... player im conducts
logical reasoning Γ→ Θ. In Section 3 we focus on cases with |e| ≤ 1. In Section 5 we will consider
more complicated belief hierarchies.
The logical reasoning of the innermost player im in Be (e = (i1, ..., im)) follows some axiom
schemata and inference rules. In Gentzen style formulation of KD-system there is one logical axiom
schemata and eleven inference rules as follows.
Logical axiom scheme: Be[A→ A],
Structural rules:
Be[Γ→ Θ]
Be[∆,Γ→ Θ,Λ](Th)
Be[Γ→ Θ, A], Be[A,∆→ Λ]
Be[∆,Γ→ Θ,Λ] (Cut)
Operational rules:
Be[Γ→ Θ, A]
Be[¬A,Γ→ Θ](¬ → )
Be[A,Γ→ Θ]
Be[Γ→ Θ,¬A] (→ ¬)
Be[Γ→ Θ, A], Be[B,Γ→ Θ]
Be[A ⊃ B,Γ→ Θ] ( ⊃ → )
Be[A,Γ→ Θ, B]
Be[Γ→ Θ, A ⊃ B] (→⊃ )
Be[A,Γ→ Θ]
Be[∧Φ,Γ→ Θ](∧ → ) where A ∈ Φ
{Be[Γ→ Θ, A] : A ∈ Φ}
Be[Γ→ Θ,∧Φ] (→ ∧)
{Be[A,Γ→ Θ] : A ∈ Φ}
Be[∨Φ,Γ→ Θ] (∨ → )
Be[Γ→ Θ, A]
Be[Γ→ Θ,∨Φ, ] (→ ∨) where A ∈ Φ
Epistemic distribution rule:
Be◦i[Γ→ Θ]
Be[Bi(Γ)→ Bi(Θ)](Bi → Bi) where |Θ| ≤ 1 and i ∈ N.
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For application in cooperative games, we need the following non-logical axioms which states that
the innermost player (i.e., each player) is able to do numerical comparisons.
Non-logical axioms
Be[ → yT ≥S xU ], if and only if yT ≥S xU ∈ At2 and yi ≥ xi for each i ∈ S,
Be[ → ¬(yT ≥S xU )], if and only if yT ≥S xU ∈ At2 and yi < xi for some i ∈ S.
Finally we define the concept of proof, which describes the inference process of a player. Let
Be[Γ→ Θ] be a thought sequent. A proof of Be[Γ→ Θ] is a finite tree satisfying:
P0. Each node of the tree is associated with a thought sequent;
P1. The thought sequence associated to each leaf is an instance of a logical axiom or a non-logical
axiom;
P2. For each node, the thought sequents associated to it and its predecessors form an instance of
an inference rules;
P3. Be[Γ→ Θ] is associated to the root node.
A thought sequent Be[Γ→ Θ] is provable, denoted by ` Be[Γ→ Θ], iff there is a proof of it.
3. Knowledge for Unanimously Acceptence of Only Core Payoffs
Cooperative game theory is formulated from the viewpoint of the outsider (i.e., a researcher),
that is, the player set and the payoffs achievable by each coalition are given. In this paper, we
take the viewpoint of an insider (a player). A player has some knowledge about the game situation,
e.g., she may know payoffs that can be achieved by herself or through the cooperation with other
players, or payoffs of some other coalitions; also, she has some criterion for determining which
payoff vectors are acceptable. In this section, we use a thought sequent to describe that a player
reasons out whether a payoff vector is acceptable, and study the epistemic structure of a player’s
decision process for accepting a core-payoff vector. Our main questions are
(1) How to formulate a criterion corresponding to the core-payoff vectors?
(2) Given that criterion, how much knowledge is needed for a player to accept core payoffs?
(3) Given that all players have that criterion, to achieve that a payoff vector is accepted unanimously
if and only if it is in the core, how much knowledge is needed in total and how should the knowledge
be distributed among players?
Let G = (N, v) with v(S) ∈ N for each S ⊆ N . For each i ∈ N and xN ∈ At1, consider the
following formula:
¬
∨
Si
∨
yS∈At1
(yS ∧ yS ≥S xN ∧ yS >i xN ) (2)
It means that there does not exist a coalition S including i and a payoff vector y such that y is
achievable by coalition S, each player in S at y gets at least as much as she gets at x, and i’s payoff
is strictly improved from x to y. In other words there is no way to strictly improve player i’s payoff
at x through cooperation. Hence (2) can be taken as a criterion for player i. For each i ∈ N and
xN ∈ At1, we use Ci(xN ) to denote the formula in (2). A player’s knowledge is described by a set
of formulae. Given player i’s knowledge Γi ⊆ P, a payoff vector x is C-acceptable for player i iff
` Bi[Γi → Ci(xN )]; x is C-unacceptable iff ` Bi[Γi → ¬Ci(xN )].
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A player’s knowledge here is restricted to what can be obtained through collective activities,
i.e., she may know v(S) for some S but may not know v(T ) for some T. Formally, for each S ⊆ N,
let I(S) = {yS ∈ At1 : Σi∈Syi ≤ v(S)}. Given Si ⊆ 2N , let Γi(Si) = ∪S∈SiI(S) ∪ {¬yT : yT ∈ At1
− ∪S∈Si I(S)}. Γi(Si) is interpreted as knowledge about what can be obtained for each coalition
S ∈ Si while other payoff vectors are inaccessible. Now we can explore which payoff vector is
C-acceptable for each Si ∈ 2N . The following example gives the intuition.
Example 3.1. Consider the 2-person game in Example 1.1, i.e., v({1}) = v({2}) = 10 and
v({1, 2}) = 30. The core is {(x, 30 − x) : 10 ≤ x ≤ 20}. Here we take player 1’s viewpoint
and consider only payoff vectors with integer entries. First, suppose player 1 does not know any
coalition’s payoff. This can be described by letting S1 = ∅ (equivalently, Γ1(S1) = {¬yS : yS ∈ At1},
that is, no payoff vector is known to be accessible to her. This can be interpreted as that, since
she does not know any possibility of cooperation, she has no way to achieve any payoff. It can be
seen that for any integer vector xN ∈ At1, ` B1[Γ1(S1) → Ci(xN )] since ` B1[Γ1(S1) → ¬yS ] for
each yS ∈ At1. The proof is as follows:{
B1[¬yS→¬yS ]
B1[Γ1(S1)→¬yS ]
(Th)
B1[Γ1(S1)→¬yS∨yS≥SxN∨yS>1xN ](→ ∨)
}
S1, yS∈At1
B1[Γ1(S1)→
∧
S1
∧
yS∈At1
(¬yS∨yS≥SxN∨yS>1xN )]
(→ ∧) (3)
Also, since it can be proved that B1[∧S1∧yS∈At1 (¬yS∨yS≥SxN∨yS>1xN )→ ¬∨S1∨yS∈At1¬(yS∧
yS ≥S xN ∧ yS >1 xN )], it follows by the inference rule (Cut) that ` B1[Γ1(S1) → ¬ ∨S1
∨yS∈At1¬(yS ∧ yS ≥S xN ∧ yS >1 xN )], i.e., ` B1[Γ1(S1)→ C1(xN )]. This result coincides with the
intuition that when a player is “helplessly ignorant” and does not know what can be achieved by
herself or through cooperation with others, she can only bear any payment offered to her.
Now we suppose that player 1 knows v({1}), i.e., how much she can earn by herself. Let
S′1 = {{1}}. Her knowledge can be described by Γ1(S′1)(= I({1}) ∪ {¬yS : yS ∈ At1 − I({1})}).
Now some payoff vectors is C-unacceptable. For example, consider x = (9, 21). Since (10, 0)1 ∈ S′1,
it can be proved that B1[Γ1(S′1)→ ¬C1(xN )]:
B1[(10,0)
1→(10,0)1]
B1[→(10,0)1≥1xN ]
B1[(10,0)
1→(10,0)1≥1xN ]
(Th)
B1[→(10,0)1>1xN ]
B1[(10,0)
1→(10,0)1>1xN ]
(Th)
B1[(10,0)
1→(10,0)1∧(10,0)1≥1xN∧(10,0)1>1xN ]
(→∧)
B1[Γ1(S′1)→(10,0)1∧(10,0)1≥1xN∧(10,0)1>1xN ]
(Th)
B1[Γ1(S′1)→
∨
S1
∨
yS∈At1
(yS ∧ yS ≥S xN ∧ yS >1 xN )] (→ ∨) (4)
However, if player 1 only knows v({1}), still she may accept some payoff vectors outsider the core.
For example, consider x = (10, 10). It can be seen that x is C-acceptable since for each S  1
and yS ∈ At1, it is either ` B1[Γ1(S′1) → ¬yS ] or ` B1[Γ1(S′1) → ¬(yS >1 xN )]. Actually, x can
be rejected by player 1 only if she knows how much can be obtained by cooperating with player
2. Let S′′1 = {{1, 2}}. Now her knowledge can be described as Γ1(S′′1)(= I({1, 2}) ∪ {¬yS : yS ∈
At1 − I({1, 2})}). It can be shown in a similar way as (4) that ` B1[Γ1(S′′1)→ ¬C1(xN )].
Yet, even if player 1 knows v({1}) and v({1, 2}), she still accepts some payoff vectors outside
the core, for example, x = (30, 0). On the other hand, player 2 would reject x if he knows v({2}).
Let S∗i = {{i}, {1, 2}} (i = 1, 2). It can be seen that if an integer payoff vector x is in the core, then
` Bi[Γi(S∗i ) → Ci(xN )] for both i = 1, 2; if x does not in the core, then ` Bi[Γi(S∗i ) → ¬Ci(xN )]
for at least one player i.
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From Example 3.1, one may notice some relationship between C-acceptance and knowledge.
First, the core payoffs are always C-acceptable regardless of knowledge. This is shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 (Core payoffs are C-acceptable) Let i ∈ N and Si ⊆ 2N . For each x ∈ NN
with Σi∈Nxi ≤ v(N), if x ∈ C(G), then ` Bi[Γi(Si)→ Ci(xN )] for each i ∈ N.
The proof of Proposition 3.1 needs the following lemma. Let Φ be a non-empty set of formulae.
We use ¬Φ to denote the set {¬A : A ∈ Φ}.
Lemma 3.1 (Completeness and consistency). Let G = (N, v) with v(S) ∈ N for each S ⊆ N,
and Γi be a set of formulae satisfying the following two conditions
(a) Γi ⊆ At1 ∪ ¬At1;
(b) for each yS ∈ At1, either yS ∈ Γi or ¬yS ∈ Γi but not both.
Then for each x ∈ NN , either ` Bi[Γi → Ci(xN )] or ` Bi[Γi → ¬Ci(xN )] but not both.
Proof. Let x ∈ NN . We consider the following two cases:
Case 1. Bi[→ ¬yS ≥S xN ] is a non-logical axiom for each S  i and each yS ∈ At1. it can be
shown in a similar way as in (3) that Bi[Γi → ∧Si ∧y∈At1 (yS ∨ ¬yS >i xN )]. Since Bi[∧Si ∧y∈At1
(yS ∨¬yS >i xN )→ ¬∨Si∨y∈At1(yS ∧ yS ≥S xN ∧ yS >i xN )], it follows by (Cut) that ` B1[Γ1 →
Ci(x
N )].
Case 2. there is some S  i and some y ∈ At1 such that Bi[→ yS ≥S xN ] is a non-logical axiom.
Let Di(x
N ) = {yS ∈ At1 : S  i, Bi[→ yS ≥S xN ] is a non-logical axiom}. We consider the following
subcases:
Case 2.1. If for each yS ∈ Di(xN ), ¬yS ∈ Γi, then it can be shown in a similar way as in (3) that
Bi[Γi → ∧Si ∧yS∈Di(xN ) (¬yS ∧ yS ≥S xN )], which, since Bi[∧Si ∧yS∈Di(xN ) (¬yS ∧ yS ≥S xN )→
∧Si ∧yS∈Di(xN ) ¬(yS ∧ yS ≥S xN ∧ yS >i xN )], implies Bi[Γi → ∧Si ∧yS∈Di(xN ) ¬(yS ∧ yS ≥S
xN ∧ yS >i xN )] by (Cut). If {yS ∈ At1 : S  i} − Di(xN ) 6= ∅, it can also be shown in a
similar manner as in (3) that Bi[Γi → ∧Si ∧{yS∈At1:Si}−Di(xN ) ¬(yS ∧ yS ≥S xN ∧ yS >i xN )].
Combining with Bi[Γi → ∧Si ∧yS∈Di(xN ) ¬(yS ∧ yS ≥S xN ∧ yS >i xN )], it follows from (→ ∧)
that Bi[Γi → ∧Si ∧yS∈At1 ¬(yS ∧ yS ≥S xN ∧ yS >i xN )], and consequently Bi[Γi → Ci(xN )].
Case 2.2. Suppose that for some yS ∈ Di(xN ), yS ∈ Γi. Let di(xN ) = {yS ∈ Di(xN ) ∩ Γi :
Bi[→ yS >i xN ] is a non-logical axiom}. If di(xN ) = ∅, it can be shown in a similar way as in case
2.1 that Bi[Γi → ∧Si∧yS∈At1 ¬(yS ∧yS ≥S xN ∧yS >i xN )], and consequently Bi[Γi → Ci(xN )]. If
di(x
N ) 6= ∅, then it can be shown in a similar way as in in (4) that Bi[Γi → ∨Si∨yS∈At1 (yS∧yS ≥S
xN ∧ yS >i xN )], i.e., ` B1[Γ1 → ¬Ci(xN )].
That ` Bi[Γi → Ci(xN )] and ` Bi[Γi → ¬Ci(xN )] cannot hold simultaneously can be seen
clearly from the proof. //
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Suppose that 0 Bi[Γi(Si) → Ci(xN )] for some i ∈ N. Since Γi(Si)
satisfies conditions (a) and (b) in Lemma 3.1, it follows that ` Bi[Γi(Si) → ¬Ci(xN )] for some
i ∈ N. Hence there is some i ∈ N, T  i, and yT ∈ Γi(Si) such that ` Bi[Γi(Si) → yT ∧ yT ≥T
xN ∧ yT >i xN ], and consequently ` Bi[Γi(Si)→ yT ], ` Bi[→ yT ≥T xN ], and ` Bi[→ yT >i xN ].
Consider the formula yT . Since Γi(Si) = ∪S∈SiI(S)∪{¬yT : yT ∈ At1 −∪S∈S I(S)}, it follows that
yT ∈ I(T ), i.e., Σj∈T yj ≤ v(T ). Also, ` Bi[→ yT ≥T xN ] implies that yj ≥ xj for each j ∈ T,
and ` Bi[→ yT >i xN ] implies that yi > xi. Hence Σj∈Txj < Σj∈T yj ≤ v(T ), and consequently
x /∈ C(G). //
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Proposition 3.1 states that accepting core-payoff vectors does not need any knowledge. Then
the problem is what kind of knowledge leads one to reject payoff vectors outside the core. It can
be seen from the proof of Proposition 3.1 that for each player i, her knowledge about any coalition
not containing her does not help in making rejection-decision; only the knowledge on coalitions
containing her helps. This is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 (Knowledge about irrelevant coalitions is useless) Let i ∈ N, Si ⊆ 2N ,
and T ∈ 2N − Si with i /∈ T. Then for each x ∈ NN with Σi∈Nxi ≤ v(N), ` Bi[Γi(Si)→ Ci(xN )] if
and only if ` Bi[Γi(Si ∪ {T})→ Ci(xN )].
Proof. We show the If part. The Only-if part can be shown in a similar manner. Suppose that
0 Bi[Γi(Si ∪ {T}) → Ci(xN )]. Since Γi(Si ∪ {T}) satisfies conditions (a) and (b) in Lemma 3.1,
it follows that ` Bi[Γi(Si ∪ {T}) → ¬Ci(xN )]. Hence there is some S ∈ Si ∪ {T} with S  i and
yS ∈ I(S) such that ` Bi[I(S)→ yS ∧yS ≥T xN ∧yS >i xN ]. Since S  i, S 6= T, and consequently
S ∈ Si, that is, yS is still in Γi(Si), and still ` Bi[Γi(Si) → yS ∧ yS ≥T xN ∧ yS >i xN ] holds. By
(→ ∨) it follows that ` Bi[Γi(Si)→ ¬Ci(xN )]. //
Proposition 3.2 implies that, for each player, only knowledge about coalitions including her
helps rejection. First, we show that if each player knows all coalitions containing her, then only
core-payoff vectors are unanimously accepted.
Proposition 3.3 (Full knowledge characterizes the core) Let G = (N, v) with v(S) ∈ N for
each S ⊆ N. For each i ∈ N, let S∗i = ∪Si{I(S)}. Then for each x ∈ NN with Σi∈Nxi ≤ v(N),
x ∈ C(G) if and only if ` Bi[Γi(S∗i )→ Ci(xN )] for each i ∈ N.
Proposition 3.3 is a corollary of Theorem 3.1 in the following, so we omit its proof. It should
be noted that this is a decentralization of knowledge in the sense that a player does not need to
know all coalitions. On the other hand, when N grows very large, this is demanding on a player’s
cognitive ability since she has to know 2|N |−1 coalitions. Hence it is natural to wonder whether
each player really needs to know so many coalitions for reaching an agreement only on core-payoff
vectors. We have the following theorem, which characterize unanimous acceptance of only core
payoffs in terms of the minimal knowledge.
Theorem 3.1 (Knowledge for characterizing the core) Let N be a set of players and GN =
{(N, v) : v(S) ∈ N for each S ⊆ N}. For each player i ∈ N, let Si ⊆ {S ⊆ N : S  i}.
(1) Let G = (N, v) ∈ GN . If ∪i∈NSi = 2N − {∅}, that is, for each S ⊆ N with S 6= ∅, there is
some i ∈ N such that S ∈ Si, then for each x ∈ NN with Σi∈Nxi ≤ v(N), x ∈ C(G) if and only if
` Bi[Γi(Si)→ Ci(xN )] for each i ∈ N.
(2) If ∪i∈NSi 6= 2N − {∅}, then there is some (N, v) ∈ GN such that for some x ∈ NN with
Σi∈Nxi ≤ v(N) and x /∈ C(G), ` Bi[Γi(Si)→ Ci(xN )] for each i ∈ N.
Proof. (1) (If) Suppose that x /∈ C(G). Then there is some S ⊆ N (S 6= ∅) such that Σi∈Sxi <
v(S). Let j be a player satisfying that j ∈ S and S ∈ Sj . Define y ∈ RN as follows: for each i ∈ N
yi =
{
xi +
1
|N | if i ∈ S
xi otherwise
Since x ∈ NN and v(S) ∈ N, Σi∈Syi ≤ v(S) and yi × |N | ∈ N for each i ∈ N, that is, yS ∈
I(S). Also, by construction it can be seen that yi ≥ xi for each i ∈ S and yj > xj , that is,
Bj [→ yS ≥S xN ] and Bj [→ yS >j xN ] are non-logical axioms. Hence it can be shown that
Bj [Γj(Sj) → yS ∧ yS ≥S xN ∧ yS >i xN ]. By (→ ∨) ` Bj [Γj(Sj) → ¬Ci(xN )] holds. By Lemma
3.1, it follows that 0 Bj [Γj(Sj)→ Cj(xN )].
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(Only-if) Suppose that 0 Bi[Γi(Si) → Ci(xN )] for some i ∈ N. It follows from Lemma 3.1
that ` Bi[Γi(Si)→ ¬Ci(xN )]. Hence there is some T  i, and yT ∈ Γi(Si) such that ` Bi[Γi(Si)→
yT ∧ yT ≥T xN ∧ yT >i xN ], and consequently ` Bi[Γi(Si) → yT ], ` Bi[→ yT ≥T xN ], and
` Bi[→ yT >i xN ]. Consider the payoff vector y. Since yT ∈ I(T ), Σj∈T yj ≤ v(T ); also, ` Bi[→
yT ≥T xN ] implies that yj ≥ xj for each j ∈ T, and ` Bi[→ yT >i xN ] implies that yi > xi. Hence
Σj∈Txj < Σj∈T yj ≤ v(T ), and consequently x /∈ C(G).
(2) Let S ⊆ N with S 6= ∅ such that S /∈ Si for each i ∈ N. We define G = (N, v) ∈ GN such that
v(N) = v(S) = |N | and v(T ) = 0 for all other T ⊆ N. We consider the following two cases.
Case 1. S = N. It can be seen that C(G) = {z ∈ RN+ : Σj∈Nzj = |N |}. Consider x = (0, ..., 0).
Though x /∈ C(G), it can be shown that ` Bi[Γi(Si) → Ci(xN )] for each i ∈ N. Indeed, since
Γi(Si) = {(0, ..., 0)T : T ∈ Si} ∪ {¬yT : T ∈ At1 − ∪SiI(S)} for each i ∈ N, for each yT ∈ At1,
either ` Bi[Γi(Si)→ ¬yT ] or ` Bi[Γi(Si)→ ¬yT >i xN ]. Therefore ` Bi[Γi(Si)→ Ci(xN )] for each
i ∈ N.
Case 2. S 6= N. It can be seen that C(G) = {z ∈ RN+ : Σj∈Nzj = v(S) = |N | and zj = 0 for
each j /∈ S}. Consider x = (1, ..., 1). Though x /∈ C(G), we show that ` Bi[Γi(Si) → Ci(xN )] for
each i ∈ N. Only players in S may reject x. Let j ∈ S. Since S /∈ Sj , by construction for each
yT ∈ Γj(Sj), when T 6= N, yj = 0. It follows that Bj [Γj(Sj) → ¬yT >j xN ] and consequently
Bj [Γj(Sj) → ¬(yT ∧ yT ≥T xN ∧ yT >j xN )]; when T = N, since x is on the Pareto boundary,
Bj [→ yN ≥N xN ] is a non-logical axiom if and only if y = x, i.e., Bj [→ ¬yN >i xN ] is a non-
logical axiom. Consequently, ` Bj [Γj(Sj) → ¬(yT ∧ yT ≥T xN ∧ yT >j xN )], which implies that
` Bj [Γj(Sj)→ Cj(xN )]. Therefore, x is C-acceptable for each i ∈ N. //
Theorem 3.1 has two implications. On one hand, it provides insights into the relationship
between knowledge and social justice. It has long been an important issue in the literature that
lack of information may lead to social injustice (cf. Kegan [27], Davis and Harrison [15]). As
Charon [13] (p. 112) puts it, “Those who lack knowledge and understanding of the situation in
which they act are especially limited in their freedom of thought, and this will have implications
for the choices they make for their action.” Theorem 3.1 makes this point more specific, showing
that the realization of an unjust allocation might originated from the lack of knowledge about the
value of some coalitions (because of, say, ignorance, unawareness, or intentional manipulation of
information).
On the other hand, it also shows that acheiving social justice is difficult in a society composed
by a large population of individuals with bounded cognitive ability. If |N | = n and each individual
can know at most k coalitions, Theorem 3.1 requires that 2n − 1 ≤ kn, i.e., k ≥ (2n − 1)/n, which
implies that a large population requires a high cognitive ability in average, and the requirement
grows exponentially when n increases. This gives us a new aspect to re-consider some classical
results in the literature. An example will be given in Section 4.
4. Epistemic Incosistency Behind Debreu-Scarf Theorem
An implication of Theorem 3.1 is that, to reject an allocation outside the core, a coalition which
can achieve an allocation dominating it should be known to one member it. Such a coalition can
be called effective in filtering out non-core-payoffs. In a game with a large number of players, there
may probably exist many effective coalitions, and to know all of them is cognitively demanding.
This intuition leads to a reconsideration of some classical results in the literature, for example,
Debreu-Scarf [16]’s Theorem from the epistemic perspective.
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Debreu-Scarf Theorem states that, when the number of participants in a replica economy
increases unboundedly, the core of the economy converges to the set of competitive equilibria.
In this section, we use an example to show that there is an epistemic inconsistency behind the
convergence. That is, as the number of participants in a replica economy increases, at least one
player has to have unbounded cognitive ability to filter out the non-core-payoffs, while competitive
equilibria, regardless of the population, always requires an unvaried cognitive ability for each player,
that is, the ability of knowing the prices and her own preferences.
For simplicity, here we focus on pure exchange economy. A pure exchange economy is a tuple
E = (N,M, {ei}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ), where N is the set of participants of the economy, M is the set of
commodities, ei ∈ RM+ is the endowment bundle of commodities and ui is a utility function on
RM of participant i ∈ N. In the following, we consider the simplest pure exchange economy, called
Edgeworth economy, where N = {1, 2} and M = {1, 2}. We adopt the model in Shapley [43] and
assume that E satisfies the following conditions:
E1. e1 = (1, 0) and e2 = (0, 1);
E2. ui is identical for each i ∈ N, i.e., there is some u such that ui = u for each i ∈ N ;
E3. u is continuous, increasing, strictly concave, and homothetic (i.e., there is an increasing
function f such that f(u(x1, x2)) is positively homogeneous of degree 1).
A competitive equilibrium of E is a pair (p, (xi)i∈N ) where p ∈ RM and xi ∈ RM for each i ∈ N
satisfying the following two conditions:
CE1. Σi∈Nxi = Σi∈Nei;
CE2. For each i ∈ N, p · xi ≤ p · ei, and for each yi ∈ RM with p · yi ≤ p · ei, ui(xi) ≥i ui(yi).
A vector (xi)i∈N is called an equilibrium allocation of E iff there is some p ∈ RM such that
(p, (xi)i∈N ) is a competitive equilibrium of E.
Given E = (N,M, {ei}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ), we can define a game G(E) = (N, v) from E by letting
that for each S ⊆ N, v(S) = maxΣi∈Sxi=Σi∈Sei Σi∈Sui(xi). The difference is, as noted in Shapley
[43] (p.346, footnote 6), that the game defined in Section 2 discusses vectors of utilities while
an economy discusses vectors of allocations. Nevertheless, they are structurally equivalent. Let
E = (N,M, {ei}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) be a Edgeworth economy, S ⊆ N, and x = (xi)i∈N , y = (yi)i∈N be
two vectors such that xi, yi ∈ RM for each i ∈ N. We say that y dominates x via S, denoted by y
domS x, iff the following two conditions hold:
(1) ui(yi) ≥i ui(xi) for each i ∈ S;
(2) ui(yi) >i ui(xi) for some i ∈ S.
The core of E, denoted by C(E), is the set {(xi)i∈N : xi ∈ RM for each i ∈ N, Σi∈Nxi = Σi∈Nei,
and there is no S ⊆ N and (yi)i∈N with Σi∈Nyi ≤ Σi∈Nei such that y domS x}.
Given E = (N,M, {ei}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) and k ∈ N+, the k-fold replica of E is an economy Ek =
(Nk,M, {ei}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) where Nk = N × {1, ..., k} and each participant (i, t) ∈ Nk has the
endowment bundle ei and utility function ui. Now each i ∈ N is called a type of the economy.
Given an Edgeworth economy, it can be shown that its equilibria allocation are in the core. But
the core also contains other allocations. By Debreu-Scarf Theorem, when the number of replicas
increases unboundedly, the core of an Edgeworth economy satisfying E1-E3 converges to the set of
its equilibrium allocations (see Shapley [43]).
In the following, we use the logic system developed in Sections 2 and 3 to analyze the change of
players’ knowledge as the number of replicas increases. To make the analysis non-trivial, we enlarge
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the formal language defined in Section 2.2. Let E = (N,M, {ei}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) be an Edgeworth
economy. The set of atomic formulae At = At1∪ At2, where
At1 = {xS : S ⊆ N, x = (xi)i∈N such that xi ∈ QM for each i ∈ N},
At2 = {yT ≥S xU : yT , xU ∈ At1 and S ⊆ N}.
Note that we now extend At1 to include the vectors with rational entries. We adopt the following
non-logical axioms:
Be[ → yT ≥S xU ], if and only if yT ≥S xU ∈ At2 and ui(yi) ≥i ui(xi) for each i ∈ S,
Be[ → ¬(yT ≥S xU )], if and only if yT ≥S xU ∈ At2 and ui(yi) <i ui(xi) for some i ∈ S.
The non-logical axioms here requires that a player knows every other player’s utility function. In
general, this is much more demanding than the requirement in Section 2, where only the numerical
comparing ability is required. Nevertheless, since we have adopted Assumption E2, i.e., players’
utilities are identical, the non-logical axioms here only mean that each player has the ability of
reflection.
The 1-fold replica E1 of an Edgeworth economy E satisfying E1-E3 can be illustrated by the
Edgeworth Box in Figure 4.1. As shown in Shapley [43], the core of E1 is the segment of diagonal
between f and g (called the contract curve).
Figure 4.1: The Edgeworth Box of E
First, as shown in Example 3.1, if a player neither knows her endowment or the possibility of
cooperation with the other player, then any allocation is C-acceptable for her. However, this epis-
temic situation seems artificial here because, in an exchanges economy, each participant exchanges
her endowments for some other bundle of commodities. Therefore, at least it should be assumed
that each participant i knows her endowment ei and consequently ui(ei).
The knowledge of i’s endowment can be represented here by a finite subset of At1 containing
formulas in the form of (ei;x)
{i}. Consider one of such set I({i}) = {(e1, e2){i}}. It is easy to see
that i would reject any allocation x represented by a point under (but not on) i’s indifference
curve through e. Formally, since Bi[→ (e1, e2){i} >i xN ] is a non-logical axiom, it is easy to see
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that Bi[I({i}) → ¬Ci(xN )]. On the other hand, for an allocation x represented by a point on or
above i’s indifference curve through e, it is impossible to prove either Bi[I({i}) → ¬Ci(xN )] or
Bi[I({i})→ Ci(xN )].
Some of those allocations can be eliminated if player i knows what can be obtained if she
cooperates (i.e., exchange) with the other participant. The ideal situations is that i knows every
point on or above her indifferent curve through e. Then every point in the lens between i’s and
j’s indifference curves through e except segment fg can be rejected. However, due to the finistic
character of formal languages, i’s knowledge can only be described by a finite set of formulae.
Hence no matter how many formulae each player knows, still there is some allocation outside the
core (the segment fg in E1) that is unanimously C-acceptable. However, from the negative side
we can show that, for each allocation x = (xi)i∈N with Σi∈Nxi = Σi∈Nei outsider the core, there
are (Γi)i∈N satisfying that for each i ∈ N,
(1) Γi is finite;
(2) (ei, y)
{i} ∈ Γi for some y;
(3) Γi − {(ei, y){i} : y ∈ QM} ⊆ {zN : z is an allocation on or above i’s indifference curve through
e};
such that ` Bi[Γi → ¬Ci(xN )] holds for at least one i ∈ N. Here, each Γi can be seen as a “partial”
knowledge about the cooperation between 1 and 2. Though there is no single partial knowledge
pair can help players to reject all payoff vectors outside the core, every such vector can be rejected
based on some partial knowledge.
On the other hand, for each allocation y on the segment fg, there is no (Γi)i∈N satisfying
conditions (1) - (3) above such that ` Bi[Γi → ¬Ci(xN )] holds for any i ∈ N.
As the number of replica grows, more points on the fg segment will be eliminate and the two
“frontiers” will be closer and closer. To describe this process as rejections of more points on fg
segment, we extend the argument above and have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 (Each non-core-payoff is rejected based on some partial knowledge).
Let E = (N,M, {ei}i∈N , {%i}i∈N ) be an Edgeworth economy satisfying E1-E3 and k ∈ N+. Con-
sider the k-th replica Ek = (Nk,M, {ei}i∈N , {%i}i∈N ) of E. For each x = (xσ)σ∈Nk such that
xσ ∈ QM for each σ ∈ Nk and Σσ∈Nkxσ ≤ Σσ∈Nkeσ, x /∈ C(Ek) if and only if there is some
σ ∈ Nk and a finite subset Γσ of ∪SσI(S) such that ` Bσ[Γσ → ¬Cσ(xN )]. Here, for each S ⊆ Nk,
I(S) = {yS : Σσ∈Syσ ≤ Σσ∈Seσ}.
Proof. For each x /∈ C(Ek), there is some y and T ⊆ Nk such that yT ∈ At1, Σσ∈T yσ ≤ Σσ∈T eσ
(i.e., yT ∈ I(T )), and y domT x. Then for any σ ∈ T with yσ > xσ and any finite Γσ ⊆ ∪SσI(S)
with yT ∈ Γσ, it can be seen that ` Bσ[Γσ → ¬Cσ(xN )] holds. //
Proposition 4.1 states that, even if in a finite formal language we could not reject all non-core
payoffs based on any finite “partial” knowledge, every non-core-payoff can be eliminated by some
finite knowledge. Now our problem is how the knowledge to reject non-core-payoffs grows when the
number of replica grows. Here we need to know what are the effective coalitions in each Ek for the
rejections. For example, consider the 2-fold replica E2 of E. First, we show that for an allocation x,
if players of the same type get the same payoff at x, then x would be blocked. Consider an allocation
x with x(1,1) 6= x(1,2) and x(1,2) %1 x(1,1). Without loss of generality, we assume that x(2,2) %2 x(2,1).
Now consider an allocation y with y(i,1) = 0.5x(i,1) + 0.5x(i,2) for i = 1, 2. Since %i is strongly
convex, y(1,1) 1 x(1,1) and y(2,1) %2 x(2,1). Further, y(1,1) +y(2,1) = 0.5Σ2i=1(x(i,1) +x(i,2)) = e1 +e2.
It follows that y dom{(1,1),(2,1)} x and y(1,1) 1 x(1,1). In formal language, for any finite Γ(1,1)
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containing y{(1,1),(2,1)}, ` B(1,1)[Γ(1,1) → ¬C(1,1)(xN )]. This results implies that for E2, we need
only consider those allocations satisfying equal treatment property, i.e., players of the same type
get the same payoffs. Therefore, still we can focus on the contract curve in the Edgeworth Box in
Figure 4.1. Also, it means that for each i = 1, 2, {(i, 1), (i, 2)} is effective and should be known to
some member of it.
On the other hand, now some allocations on the contract curve between f and g becomes C-
unacceptable. As an example, consider the allocation represented by f in Figure 4.1. Indeed, the
allocation that gives fi to each player with type i (i = 1, 2) is blocked by S = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1)}.
Consider the point h which is the middle point on the line connecting f and e and an allocation
(h1, h1, f2) among members in S. Since both f and e are allocations with quantities of rational
number, so is h. Since the preference relation %1 is strongly convex and e1 ∼1 f1, hence h1 =
1
2e1 +
1
2f1 1 f1. Also, since h1 + h1 + f2 = 12e1 + 12f1 + 12e1 + 12f1 + f2 = e1 + f1 + f2, and
f1 + f2 = e1 + e2, it follows that h1 + h1 + f2 = 2e2 + e2, that is, h1 for (1, 1) and (1, 2) and f2 for
(2, 1) is accessible within S. Here we have shown that the allocation (f1, f1, f2, f2) is dominated by
(h1, h1, f2, f2) via S. Actually, each allocation x on the fg segment which is strictly less preferred by
i to the allocation represented by the middle point y on the line connecting x and e are dominated
by y via coalition {(i, 1), (i, 2), (j, 1)}. It can be shown that there is finite sets (Γσ)σ∈N2 satisfying
conditions similar to (1) - (3) above such that ` Bσ[Γσ → ¬Cσ(xN )] holds for some σ ∈ N2.
Let us summarize the observations above. In E1, every non-empty subset of N needs to be
known to someone contained in it, that is,
{(1, 1)}, {(2, 1)};
{(1, 1), (2, 1)}
In E2, the following coalitions need to be known:
{(1, 1)}, {(1, 2)}, {(2, 1)}, {(2, 2)}; (5)
{(1, 1), (2, 1)}, {(1, 2), (2, 1)}, {(1, 1), (2, 2)}, {(2, 1), (2, 2)}; (6)
{(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1)}, {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2)}; (7)
{(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2)}. (8)
Other coalitions are unnecessarily to be known since the role they played in blocking can be
substituted by coalitions in the list. For example, the role of {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2)} is completely the
same as {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1)}. Nevertheless, the important thing is that, as the number of replica
increases to 2, some “new coalitions” are needed to be known to reject non-core-payoffs; especially,
to reject “more” payoff vectors (i.e, some points on segment fg), knowledge about more coalitions
is necessary; without them, allocations which are in C(E1) but not the competitive equilibrium
cannot be gradually rejected as the number of replica increases. This is summarized in the following
statement.
Proposition 4.2 (More coalitions for more non-core-payoffs). Let E = (N,M, {ei}i∈N , {%i
}i∈N ) be a Edgeworth economy and k ∈ N+ with k > 1. There is some T ⊆ Nk −Nk−1 such that
for some x ∈ C(Ek−1)−C(Ek), 0 Bσ[Γσ → ¬Cσ(xN )] holds for each σ ∈ Nk if Γσ is a finite subset
of ∪Sσ,S 6=T I(S) for each σ ∈ Nk.
Now we show that the necessary knowledge increases faster than the number of replica does.
As noted in Shapley [43], in general, in the k-replica Ek of E (k > 1), the following coalitions are
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effective:
(1) {(i, n)} for i = 1, 2, n = 1, ..., k;
(2) {(1, n), (2,m) : (1, n), (2,m) ∈ Nk};
(3) {(1, 1), ..., (1, n), (2, 1), ..., (2, n− 1)}, {(1, 1), ..., (1, n− 1), (2, 1), ..., (2, n)} for n = 2, ..., k, ;
(4) Nk.
And it is easy to see that, for each k ∈ N with k > 2, in additions to coalitions needed to be known
in Ek−1 (except Nk−1), Ek needs to know further
(1) {(i, k)} for i = 1, 2;
(2) {(i, k), (j,m)} for m = 1, ..., k and i 6= j;
(3) {(1, 1), ..., (1, k), (2, 1), ..., (2, k − 1)}, {(1, 1), ..., (1, k − 1), (2, 1), ..., (2, k)};
(4) Nk.
Then it is easy to see that for the k-replica Ek, k > 2, the number of effective coalitions is k
2+4k−1,
and the average number of coalitions a participator needs to know is k2 + 2− 12k . This implies that
to reject non-equilibrium allocations, as the number of replica infinitely increases, the knowledge
needed to be known also increases, and for each n ∈ N, there is some k(n) ∈ N such that some
player in Ek(n) needs to know more than n coalitions.
In contrast, in the competitive market, each participant needs only to know her own preferences
and the price. This knowledge does not change as the number of replica grows. Further, as
each participator has the same preferences, the knowledge is also symmetric. This is epistemic
inconsistency behind Debreu-Scarf Theorem: the increase of the number of replicas, on one hand,
has constant requirement on each participator’s knowledge in the competitive market, while, on
the other hand, requires unbounded epistemic ability for at least one player in the cooperative
situation.
5. Concluding Remarks
5.1. Balanced sets, knowledge, and acceptance of core payoffs
Theorem 3.1 (1) implies that, if each coalition is known by some player in it, then an empty
core (no integer core-payoff vector) implies that there is no integer payoff accessible in v(N) that
is unanimously accepted. From the viewpoint of computation, that may lead to a decentralized
approach to determine whether the core is empty. Then it is natural to wonder whether this
determination can be down based on lesser knowledge. This problem can be approached by using
balancedness.
Given the player set N, a family B of coalitions of N (i.e., B ⊆ 2N ) is called balanced iff
there is {λS}S∈B with λS ∈ [0, 1] for each S ∈ B satisfying that for each i ∈ N, ΣSiλS = 1.
{λS}S∈B is called balanced weights of B. In the following, when we consider player i’s knowledge,
we mean a set Γi = Γi(Si) for some Si ⊆ {S ⊆ N : S  i}. Given such a Γi, we denote the
family of coalitions i knows, that is, Si, by S(Γi). Given a family B of coalitions of N, we define
K(B) = {(Γi)i∈N : ∪i∈NS(Γi) = B}.
We have the following statement, whish states whether the core is empty can be determined
based on the balanced families of coalitions.
Proposition 5.1 (Knowledge of balanced sets and acceptance of the core) Let G = (N, v)
with v(S) ∈ N for each S ⊆ N. If for all balanced families B of coalitions of N , ∩i∈N{x ∈ NN :
Σi∈Nxi ≤ v(N) and ` Bi[Γi → Ci(xN )]} 6= ∅ for some (Γi)i∈N ∈ K(B), then C(G) 6= ∅.
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To show it, we need the following lemma, whose proof can be found in, e.g., Kannai [26].
Lemma 5.1 (Bandareva-Shapley Theorem). Let G = (N, v). Then C(G) 6= ∅ if and only if
for each balanced family B of coalitions of N with balanced weights {λS}S∈B, ΣS∈BλSv(S) ≤ v(N).
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Suppose that C(G) = ∅. By Lemma 5.1, there is some some balanced
family B of coalitions of N with balanced weights {λS}S∈B such that ΣS∈BλSv(S) > v(N). Let
(Γi)i∈N ∈ K(B). Suppose there is some x ∈ ∩i∈N{x ∈ NN : Σi∈Nxi ≤ v(N) and ` Bi[Γi →
Ci(x
N )]}. It follows that Σi∈Sxi ≥ v(S) for each S ∈ B. Then Σi∈Nxi = ΣS∈BλS(Σi∈Sxi) ≥
ΣS∈BλSv(S) > v(N), which is a contradiction. //
Proposition 5.1 provides a method to determine whether C(G) is empty. However, it needs to
check every balanced family B of coalitions and every (Γi)i∈N ∈ K(B), which requires an enormous
amount of computation as |N | grows. Further, the computation would be more troublesome if we
consider the computation of all balanced families (see Peleg [32]). It is wondered whether there is
simpler ways to do it. More researches are expected in this direction.
5.2. Alternative definitions of knowledge and criteria
In Section 3, we defined the knowledge about a family of coalitions S as Γ(S) = ∪S∈SI(S)∪{¬yS :
yS /∈ ∪S∈SI(S)}. An alternative is to let Γ = ∪S∈SI(S). However, it should be noted that under this
definition, Lemma 3.1 does not hold, and we should show that for some x, neither Bi[Γ → C(x)]
and Bi[Γ → ¬C(x)] are unprovable. It is also possible to define knowledge of coalitions in other
ways.
Another problem is the definition of C-acceptability. Here we did not include hierarchical belief
structure in the formula (2). That is, we did not require that for example, a player believes that all
other players in any coalition she knows also have knowledge about that coalition. In this sense,
C-acceptability may be regarded as a “na¨ıve” criterion. It is possible to include interpersonal
inferences and construct a more sophisticated criterion. For example, consider the formula
¬
∨
Si
∨
yS∈At1
(yS ∧ yS ≥S xN ∧ yS >i xN ∧
∧
j∈S,j 6=i
Bj(y
S ∧ yS ≥S xN )) (9)
It requires that not only a yS is known to player i herself but also to all players in S. If (9) is
adopted as the criterion, then knowledge/belief about other players’ knowledge/belief is also needed
for each player. How to define a player’s criterion on her belief about others’ knowledge/choice will
play a critical role in studying concepts like Vohra [47]’s enforcement of contracts and incentive
compatibility constraints. Further research can be done on formulating the decision criterion for
some solution concepts in the literature of cooperative games/competitive markets/matchings with
incomplete information, for example, the coarse core in Wilson [49] and the interim core in Schipper
[40]. Schipper [40]’s Bayesian cooperative game can be described by a KD45 Kripke model. The
syntactic part may need an extension of the system in this paper to incorporate common knowledge,
for example, by the fixed-point approach in Halpern and Moses [22].
Another direction is to study the epistemic structure of dynamic coalition formation processes,
for example, what is the logic correspondence of the forward-induction reasoning in matching
(Pomatto [36], Liu et al. [28]). It is wondered whether we can construct a parallel to the dynamic
logic model in Bonnano [8], [9] to capture some classic epistemic criteria by Battigalli [3], Battigalli
and Siniscalchi [4], Perea [35], among others, in cooperative game theory.
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